International Fragmentation of Production and Trade Volatility: An Analysis for the European Countries by Falzoni, Anna Maria & Tajoli, Lucia
Modern Economy, 2015, 6, 358-369 
Published Online March 2015 in SciRes. http://www.scirp.org/journal/me 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/me.2015.63032   
How to cite this paper: Falzoni, A.M. and Tajoli, L. (2015) International Fragmentation of Production and Trade Volatility: 
An Analysis for the European Countries. Modern Economy, 6, 358-369. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/me.2015.63032  
 
 
International Fragmentation of Production 
and Trade Volatility: An Analysis for the  
European Countries 
Anna Maria Falzoni1, Lucia Tajoli2 
1Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, Università di Bergamo, Bergamo, Italy 
2Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy 
Email: anna-maria.falzoni@unibg.it, lucia.tajoli@polimi.it  
 
Received 23 February 2015; accepted 10 March 2015; published 16 March 2015 
 
Copyright © 2015 by authors and Scientific Research Publishing Inc. 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY). 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 
  
 
 
 
Abstract 
In the last years, world exports have displayed very strong fluctuations, much higher than GDP 
fluctuations. Some recent works tried to understand the causes of these fluctuations, and in par-
ticular if these strong swings in world trade flows are related to the growing weight of interme-
diates in trade and to the phenomenon of international fragmentation of production (IFP) or in-
ternational outsourcing. This is the issue addressed in this paper. We analyze the influence of in-
ternational fragmentation of production and trade in intermediate goods on the fluctuations of 
trade flows for the EU countries. After assessing the relevance of international trade in interme-
diate goods at the sector level using indices computed from the input-output tables of the EU 
countries, we test whether a significant relation exists between the extent of international frag-
mentation of production measured by this proxy and the volatility of trade flows, and the possible 
implications of these results. 
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1. Introduction 
A distinctive feature of the recent international economic crisis has been the dramatic effect it displayed on in-
ternational trade. The trade collapse of 2009, amounting to a fall of 12% in volume according to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) data, was subject of a number of analysis and concerns, as it appeared by far as the 
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largest drop since World War II. Quite remarkable and to some extent unexpected was also the fast rebound 
registered in 2010, when trade increased by 14.5% [1] suggesting a very strong pro-cyclicality of international 
trade. Even before the crisis, in the past decade world exports typically displayed fluctuations much stronger 
than GDP fluctuations, and even if the crisis has amplified this behavior, this might not be a short-term cyclical 
effect.  
Some recent works tried to understand the causes of trade fluctuations [2], and whether the amplified swings 
in world trade flows are related to structural changes in the composition of trade, in particular to the growing 
weight of intermediate inputs in trade and to the phenomenon of international fragmentation of production, IFP 
[3]-[5] or international outsourcing. The relevant role of intermediate inputs for macroeconomic changes in in-
dustrialized and industrializing economies has already been highlighted in the literature [6] [7]. Intermediate in-
puts play an increasingly relevant role also in international trade thanks to the diffusion of international frag-
mentation of production [8] [9], spreading the different phases of the production chain of a good across many 
countries, and giving rise to international exchanges of the good at various stages of production across the coun-
tries involved [10]. This organization of production can affect world trade volatility through a number of chan-
nels.  
First of all, it is possible to show that intermediate goods can generate a sort of multiplier in a simple ma-
croeconomic framework, amplifying the variations of many variables, including trade flows. Furthermore, from 
the accounting point of view, there can be a statistical effect due to the “double counting” of trade values when a 
good crosses borders many times during different production phases. This can increase the growth of trade over 
time, but it can also amplify the fall in the low phases of the business cycle [11] [12]. Another possible channel 
of additional volatility, suggested by some open macroeconomic models, arises because international fragmenta-
tion of production can increase the synchronicity of the business cycles of the countries involved in the different 
phases of the production process by linking demand and production cycles among these countries (see for ex-
ample [13]-[16]). In presence of IFP, a demand shock for final goods in a country is a demand shock for inter-
mediate goods or components in another, and the resulting effect on inventories of internationally traded com-
ponents can also affect the supply chain in third countries [17]. Such links can therefore amplify the volatility of 
the resulting trade flows1.  
But other models also suggest that the presence of international production chains can have a stabilizing role 
on international trade. If the costs of setting up a trade relationship to organize an international production net-
work are relevant and sunk for most firms [21] [22], the presence of such costs can make the trade relationships 
related to IFP quite stable over time, and less volatile than the traditional trade flows of final goods [23]. 
The relationship between IFP and trade fluctuations suggested by the theory is open to empirical testing. In 
this paper we want to analyze the influence of international fragmentation of production on the fluctuations of 
trade flows for the EU countries. As shown in Figure 1, also for the EU27 export flows are strongly pro-cyclical, 
and the recent international crisis sharply increased trade volatility. EU27 exports slowed down remarkably in 
2008, and eventually dropped by more than 16% in value in 2009, bouncing back almost entirely in 2010. Fur-
thermore, the EU member countries are on average quite open to international trade and are all deeply connected 
—even if to different extents—to international networks of production and involved in IFP among them and 
with third countries. Therefore, this group of countries can represent a good sample to look for the existence of a 
relationship between IFP and trade volatility.  
In the following sections, we first present a simplified theoretical framework linking intermediate inputs and 
macroeconomic fluctuations. We then display some evidence on the extent of volatility of trade flows at the 
sector level for 20 EU countries, including in the analysis the EU countries for which updated and homogeneous 
input-output tables of imports are available. These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain and Sweden. Unfortunately we cannot include all EU members for lack of homogenous data. We as-
sess the relevance of international fragmentation of production in the manufacturing sectors of those countries, 
using as a proxy some indices computed from the input-output tables. We then test whether a significant relation 
exists between international trade in intermediate inputs and the volatility of trade flows in the same sectors, and 
the possible implications of these results.  
 
 
1Very recent studies have focused on the role of firms in the business cycles, arguing that idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms signifi-
cantly contribute to aggregate fluctuations (see for example [18]-[20]). 
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Figure 1. Yearly percent variations in EU27 GDP and export 2000-2011 at current 
prices. Source: Eurostat. 
2. Macroeconomic Fluctuations and Intermediate Goods 
The idea that linkages between sectors created by intermediate goods are central to economic performance has 
been around for nearly a century, but it was kept in the background for a long time. As the need of physical 
proximity to perform different tasks and different stages of production in many sectors diminished, the practice 
to outsource segments of production to other industrial sectors has increased and the role of intermediate inputs 
gained new relevance. With the reduction of barriers to international trade, outsourcing became increasingly in-
ternational, generating flows of trade in intermediate goods.  
It is fairly straight forward to show that linkages between sectors can generate a multiplier similar to other 
multipliers associated with macroeconomic variables. A recent paper by [7] presents a simple example showing 
how such a multiplier can work. Assume gross output Qt is produced using primary factors of production (e.g. Kt 
and Lt) and intermediate goods Xt according to the expression: 
( )11t t t tQ A K L X
σα α σ−−=                                    (1) 
where 0 α< , 1σ < . Gross output can be used for consumption or investment, but also as an intermediate good. 
In this very simplified framework, it is assumed that a constant share x  of gross output is used as an interme-
diate good, so that gross domestic product in this economy is defined as ( )1t tY x Q= −  and 
1t tX Qx+ =                                        (2) 
Assuming that also investments are a constant share of GDP, and that they depreciate at a constant rate, in 
steady state GDP is given by 
( )
( ) ( )
1 11 11 t tY A x x K L
σσ σ α α
−− − = −                               (3) 
In this framework, changes in the allocation of resources defined by x  are amplified by the multiplier given 
by ( )1 1 σ− . It is also worth noting that the effect of changes in x  on Y depends crucially on the level of σ , 
which represents the importance of intermediate goods in the aggregate production function.  
If the economy opens up and international fragmentation of production becomes possible, and intermediate 
inputs can be imported, expression (1) will be modified so that intermediate goods used in production become 
( )t tX O+ , where Ot represents imported intermediate inputs. Import of intermediate goods can change x , and 
it might also increase the total amount of intermediate inputs used, also changing the GDP level. Importing in-
termediate goods makes possible to reach a higher GDP with the same factors’ endowment in the short run, as 
gross output is positively related to the total amount of inputs used in production2. The impact of imported in-
puts on gross output needs not to be the same as the domestic inputs (if for example imported inputs have a 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
GDP
Export
 
 
2Reference [24] shows that GDP growth in the EU is indeed positively correlated with the extent of international fragmentation of produc-
tion. 
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different technological content). But the relationship between x  and Y in (3) is non-monotonic (hump-shaped) 
and reductions in x  will increase Y in steady state only up to a point3. Changes in the amount of imported in-
puts can therefore per se give rise to variations in GDP. If we further assume that also imported intermediate in-
puts are proportional to gross output and inversely proportional to x , we have in this framework a co-cyclical 
behavior of trade and output driven by the supply-side of the economy, additional to the aggregate demand 
pro-cyclicity4. Therefore, in presence of trade in intermediate goods, changes in the economy can give rise to 
variations in trade flows much stronger than the ones expected considering only demand for final goods. 
Even in this very simplified framework, the correlation of the movements of GDP and trade depends on a 
number of parameters, first of all on x , σ , and the ratio of imported inputs over total inputs used. This means 
that a correlation between IFP and high volatility in trade flows can occur for some countries and some indus-
tries, but it is very difficult to generalize such a relationship. 
3. Trade Volatility in the EU Countries  
The expressions in the previous section representing the aggregate economy can be seen as the (geometric) av-
erage of sectoral production functions, using intermediate goods to different extents. Previous results in the lite-
rature stress the different cyclical properties of trade flows of different types of goods, and especially of durable 
and non-durables [25] [26]. For these reasons, it is important to examine the behavior of trade flows at the sector 
level. Here we consider 22 manufacturing sectors5, and indeed the extent of fluctuations of EU trade flows ap-
pears quite differentiated across sectors.  
In what follows, the volatility of trade flows is measured first of all in terms of standard deviations of quar-
terly trade values at current prices over the observation period, 1999-2011 and in the years of the crisis, 2008- 
2011. These standard deviations of trade flows are normalized by taking their ratio on GDP standard deviations 
over the same period6. We also compute volatility as the standard deviation of quarterly percentage changes in 
the value of export and import in each sector. Table 1(a) and Table 1(b) report the average variation of imports 
and exports of the 20 EU countries considered for all manufacturing sectors.  
As expected, volatility is generally high in many advanced or durable goods sectors, like motor vehicles and 
transport equipment, office machinery and communication equipment. Depending on the measure used, volatil-
ity is also high in some traditional sectors producing consumers’ goods, such as apparel. We can also observe 
that variations in export and imports flows appear correlated, as shown in other works. 
The volatility of trade flows increased sharply during the international economic crisis in many sectors. On 
average, but also for a number of sectors and countries, trade volatility in the 2008-2011 period is higher than 
the average volatility in the 1999-2011 period, even if also in this respect we can observe differences across 
sectors. In some sectors we have a collapse of trade at the beginning of 2009, with a drop of trade values on a 
year-to-year basis over 30%, with a strong rebound in the following quarters, while in other sectors trade re-
mains much more stable, and a few cases even display a modest growth.  
4. International Fragmentation of Production and Trade in Intermediate Goods in 
the EU Countries  
Many sectors’ characteristics can influence the observed differences in volatility, both because of the organiza-
tion of production and because of demand patterns. As mentioned, we focus on the role of IFP and on trade in 
intermediate goods related to IFP, putting aside the possible role of other factors. 
There is not a uniquely identified indicator to measure the extent of IFP in any given sector. The very defini-
tion of IFP often slightly changes moving from one work and context to another, let alone any precise measure-
ment of this phenomenon. Here we use the data available in the input-output (I-O) tables provided by Eurostat 
for the year 2000 and 2005 to build two different indices of intermediate goods trade. The first is the so-called 
index of narrow offshoring, commonly used in the literature to measure the share of imported intermediate  
 
 
3Note that even with an increase in GDP this does not necessary imply a higher level of consumption in the same period or in the steady 
state, as imports will have to be paid with exports, absorbing a part of GDP. Therefore, welfare implications are not straight forward. 
4Considering the demand side of the economy and imports of final goods are proportional to GDP, also displaying the usual pro-cyclical be-
havior. 
5We adopt the sectoral disaggregation used in Eurostat input-output tables, compiled following the classification NACE Rev. 1. 
6Our volatility measure is equivalent to the one used by [25]. 
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Table 1. (a) Average volatility indices of trade flows relative to GDP in EU manufacturing sectors; (b) Average volatility 
indices of trade flows in EU manufacturing sectors. 
(a) 
Manufacturing sectors Sector code (NACE Rev. 1) 
Export st. dev.  
in % of GDP st. 
dev. 1999-2011 
Export st. dev.  
in % of GDP st. 
dev. 2008-2011 
Import st.dev.  
in % of GDP st. 
dev. 1999-2011 
Import st. dev.  
in % of GDP st. 
dev. 2008-2011 
Food and beverages 15 3.87 6.17 3.95 4.94 
Tobacco products 16 0.24 0.46 0.19 0.42 
Textiles 17 0.68 1.44 0.63 1.62 
Wearing apparel 18 1.02 2.29 1.24 2.85 
Leather and footwear 19 0.55 1.57 0.66 1.71 
Products of wood and cork (exc. furniture) 20 0.92 1.78 0.65 1.13 
Paper and paper products 21 1.11 2.42 0.68 1.39 
Publishing and printing 22 0.29 0.49 0.19 0.44 
Manufacture of fuels 23 5.74 13.02 5.09 10.71 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 9.86 13.59 8.03 10.41 
Rubber and plastic products 25 1.91 3.43 1.66 2.70 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 0.71 1.48 0.70 1.39 
Manufacture of basic metals 27 5.35 11.84 5.75 12.78 
Fabricated metal products  
(exc. machinery and equipment) 28 1.91 3.17 1.67 3.05 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 5.76 10.30 4.43 9.67 
Office machinery and computers 30 2.29 3.86 2.10 4.66 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31 3.07 5.31 2.34 4.40 
Communication equipment and apparatus 32 6.02 11.37 4.97 10.14 
Precision and optical instruments 33 1.93 3.07 1.53 2.38 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 6.86 14.45 6.36 15.16 
Other transport equipment 35 1.72 4.16 2.04 5.41 
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 36 1.50 2.84 1.38 2.54 
Source: our elaborations from Eurostat database. 
(b) 
Manufacturing sectors Sector code (NACE Rev. 1) 
St. dev. of %  
quart. change  
of export 
1999-2011 
St. dev. of %  
quart. change  
of export 
2008-2011 
St. dev. of %  
quart. change  
of import 
1999-2011 
St. dev. of %  
quart. change  
of import 
2008-2011 
Food and beverages 15 10.52 8.52 9.46 8.02 
Tobacco products 16 54.69 69.87 80.23 43.35 
Textiles 17 9.87 9.98 11.92 12.81 
Wearing apparel 18 24.22 24.81 26.26 26.88 
Leather and footwear 19 21.02 24.11 25.50 29.51 
Products of wood and cork (exc. furniture) 20 11.46 11.81 11.40 12.10 
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Continued  
Paper and paper products 21 8.12 7.56 6.88 6.90 
Publishing and printing 22 17.35 14.34 16.68 16.22 
Manufacture of fuels 23 34.11 27.22 24.04 21.93 
Chemicals and chemical products 24 8.65 8.73 7.44 6.80 
Rubber and plastic products 25 7.94 8.39 8.38 8.18 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 10.80 11.82 12.44 13.01 
Manufacture of basic metals 27 13.88 17.32 14.24 17.85 
Fabricated metal products  
(exc. machinery and equipment) 28 9.27 10.53 10.47 10.46 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 10.64 11.14 12.39 12.43 
Office machinery and computers 30 25.22 20.91 23.39 21.01 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 31 9.78 10.84 10.28 10.19 
Communication equipment and apparatus 32 19.89 19.33 18.97 17.88 
Precision and optical instruments 33 13.44 11.98 13.69 11.77 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 15.82 16.76 17.52 17.82 
Other transport equipment 35 49.30 58.52 53.38 55.19 
Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 36 14.79 13.95 15.74 14.00 
Source: our elaborations from Eurostat database. 
 
inputs belonging to sector i and employed for production in the same sector7. This index should provide an ap-
proximate measure of the amount of production of a given good that takes place abroad and is then embodied in 
the final good through the use of imported inputs, and therefore it is used as a proxy of IFP. The index for coun-
try c and manufacturing sector i has the following expression:  
( )Off intermediate inputsic ii i i ia= ∑  
where aii is the cell of the I-O matrix for imports measuring the value of imported intermediate inputs i em-
ployed in the same sector i, and at the denominator we have the total value of all intermediate inputs used in 
production in sector i. 
The second index that we use measures instead the weight of imports of intermediate goods j on the total val-
ue of imports of a given sector. This index is obtained as the ratio between the sum by row of the import I-O ta-
ble and the total value of all imports in the same sector: 
( )InterImp import interm. inputs tot Impic j j ii= ∑  
This index should instead capture the share of import flows in each sector that is directly affected by the pro-
duction cycle rather than by final demand. 
In Figure 2 and Figure 3 we report the indices for the year 2005, a year for which import I-O tables are 
available for the majority of EU countries from Eurostat, before the effects of the international crisis are felt. 
The indices aim at measuring some structural characteristics of the economies and manufacturing sectors of our 
sample, and although they may change over long time periods, they remain relatively stable over a few years. 
Both indices should capture the relevance of intermediate goods trade at the sector and country level, but the 
correlation between the two indices across sectors and countries is quite low, equal to 0.15 for the entire sample. 
The two indices in fact present different features of trade in intermediate goods. The narrow offshoring index 
can reveal some characteristics of the organization of production, as it measures the weight of imported inputs  
 
 
7This index was originally introduced by [27], and subsequently improved thanks to the use of input-output tables for imports. For a discus-
sion on the use of this index, see for example [28]. 
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Figure 2. Average offshoring indices and intermediates’ share over total imports in EU countries in 2005 
(Indices are weighted averages of each country’s indices in each industry). 
 
 
Figure 3. Average offshoring indices in the EU across industries in 2005 (Indices are weighted averages of 
20 EU countries’ indices in each industry). 
 
from the point of view of producing sectors. Instead the intermediate import ratio index should capture the rela-
tive weight of two components of the import demand, one coming from firms, demanding intermediate inputs 
for production, and the rest coming from final consumers demanding final goods. Even if the narrow offshoring 
index appears more appropriate to capture the extent of IFP, which is determined by producers and firms’ 
choices, in terms of explaining the volatility of trade flows also the other index more focused on demand could 
provide some indications.  
Figure 2 presents the weighted average indices of narrow offshoring and trade in intermediate goods for the 
EU countries. Many of the new EU members, highly involved in international production chains, show relative-
ly high narrow offshoring indices. The intermediate imports ratio is quite high for all countries, confirming that 
imports of intermediate inputs count for at least one third of imports for most EU countries.  
Looking at Figure 3, reporting the weighted average indices for each sector, we observe that sectoral charac-
teristics are quite different also with respect to the relevance of trade in intermediates. In the adopted classifica-
tion, some sectors produce a very limited amount of final goods, and therefore present a very high ratio of im-
ported intermediate inputs (e.g. basic metals, NACE code 27). But also the narrow offshoring index displays 
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large differences across sectors. Generally, the indices for the EU countries are in line with the existing evidence 
suggesting that some sectors (e.g. office machinery, NACE code 30 or communication equipment, NACE code 
32) are highly involved in IFP.  
5. The Relationship between Trade Volatility and Trade in Intermediate Goods  
Is the high share of intermediate goods in international trade—confirmed also for the EU countries—associated 
with high volatility and instability of trade flows? Some recent empirical evidence produced in particular for the 
US in the context of the recent international economic crisis seems to confirm this hypothesis, even if the results 
are not always robust [4] [26].  
For our sample of EU countries, the overall simple correlation for the period 1999-2011 between the measures 
of intermediate goods trade and volatility of trade flows is positive, but not very high, with a value slightly 
higher than 0.30 both for imports and exports. We also observe a positive and significant correlation between the 
share of sector’s imports over GDP and the volatility both of imports and exports: more openness is associated 
with higher volatility of trade flows, which is plausible, and it is in line with the existing evidence for other 
countries [16]. 
We then must test the significance of the relationship between trade in intermediate goods and trade volatility 
adding the appropriate control variables, to condition results on the characteristics of the industries involved, as 
suggested by the theoretical framework sketched in Section 28. Results are reported in Table 2 and Table 3.  
Considering our main variables of interest over the period 1999-2011, we observe that the narrow offshoring 
index is not always significantly correlated with the measures of trade volatility. Controlling for countries and 
industries characteristics using fixed effects, the narrow offshoring coefficient is positive and significant when 
regressed against import volatility, and it remains so adding further controls, but it becomes non-significant 
when a general openness measure is introduced. The relationship appears even less robust with respect to export 
volatility. 
We introduced in the regressions a dummy variable separating old and new EU members (taking value 1 if 
the country belongs to the EU15 group of old members), as the position that the two groups of countries hold in 
the international production chain is markedly different. The narrow offshoring index can in fact be correlated to 
trade volatility in a different way according to the organization and decision process along the production chain. 
The EU dummy always displays a negative sign, indicating that the old EU member countries’ trade has gener-
ally a lower volatility, and in some regressions, the effect of the variable is to increase the significance of the 
narrow offshoring coefficient. Offshoring affects especially trade fluctuations in the new EU member countries 
where production phases have been delocalized from old EU members9. 
Considering the ratio between imported intermediate inputs and total imports (Table 3), this is never signifi-
cantly correlated with the volatility of imports, but it displays a positive and significant coefficient in relation 
with export volatility. Also in this case, this positive correlation could depend from the high content of imported 
inputs that exports require, while a higher share of intermediate inputs over total imports per se does not affect 
the volatility of this flow. 
Overall, these results give very weak support to the view that more international fragmentation of production 
has systematically increased trade volatility. They confirm the evidence of some correlation between the two, 
but this relationship is very contingent on the specific situation analyzed.  
The relationship between trade volatility and trade in intermediate goods is more robust if we consider only 
the years of the largest trade swings, covering the most turbulent period of the economic and financial crisis. In 
Table 4 we report the estimates of this relation for volatility over 2008-2010, and we observe a higher good-
ness-of-fit of the regression for this time frame, as well as a higher and more significant coefficients for the nar-
row offshoring indices than for the entire decade. Also the coefficient of the share of intermediate inputs over 
production is reinforced. 
Much less stable is the sign and the significance of the share of inputs on total imports. The effect on import 
volatility is negative, showing that during the shock production relationships seemed more persistent than final  
 
 
8We should stress that the reported regressions, even if introducing some control variables, are only testing the correlation between the two 
variables of interest and no causality or structural relationship can be inferred from these results at this stage. In fact, volatility of trade flows 
is likely to be influenced by a number of additional factors, that we omit in these regressions. 
9This result is in line with the evidence produced by [29] and the related theoretical model ([30]), showing that the volatility of the sectors 
most involved in IFP between the U.S. and Mexico, in Mexico appeared much higher than in the U.S. 
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Table 2. Volatility of trade flows and offshoring over the period 1999-2011. 
Explanatory  
variables 
Dependent variable(a) 
Import volatility 
(normalized st. dev. of import 1999-2011) 
Export volatility 
(normalized st. dev. of export 1999-2011) 
Narrow  
offshoring(b) 
0.0150 
(0.0084)* 
0.0148 
(0.0083)* 
−0.0107 
(0.0066) 
0.0354 
(0.0077)*** 
−0.0083 
(0.0058) 
0.0123 
(0.0132) 
0.0164 
(0.0127) 
−0.0184 
(0.0109)* 
0.0472 
(0.0116) *** 
−0.0136 
(0.0096) 
Inputs over 
production  
0.0121 
(0.0166) 
−0.0215 
(0.0129)* 
0.0285 
(0.0151)* 
−0.0174 
(0.0109)  
0.0433 
(0.0254)* 
0.0014 
(0.0214) 
0.0586 
(0.0228)** 
−0.0003 
(0.0179) 
Import value(b)  6.07e−07 (2.14e−07)***  
3.49e−07 
(1.55e−07)**   
1.18e−06 
(3.27e−07)***  
7.69e−07 
(2.34e−07)***  
Import/GDP(b)   1.5494 (0.0927)***  
1.3729 
(0.0834)***   
2.1045 
(0.1539)***  
1.7771 
(0.1367)*** 
Dummy EU15    −0.0069 (0.0027)*** 
−0.0048 
(0.0025)*    
−0.0072   
(0.0040)* 
−0.0069 
(0.0042)* 
Import/GDP*EU15     0.9122 (0.1091)***     
1.4938 
(0.1789)*** 
Country dummy yes yes yes no no yes yes yes no no 
Sector dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No. observations 434 432 432 432 432 434 432 432 432 432 
R2 0.5594 0.5702 0.7448 0.5001 0.7472 0.4191 0.4487 0.6154 0.3801 0.6285 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Coefficients with ***, **, * are significant at 99%, 95% e 90% respectively. (a)Volatility is computed in terms of standard 
deviation of quarterly imports and exports in the period 1999Q1-2011Q4 (or 2008Q1-2011Q4). The volatility index of imports and exports is taken as the ratio 
of these flows standard deviations and the standard deviations of GDP in the corresponding period. (b)Variables computed for the year 2005, All data used to 
build the variables come from Eurostat. 
 
Table 3. Volatility of trade flows and intermediates trade over the period 1999-2011. 
Explanatory 
variables 
Dependent variable(a) 
Import volatility 
(normalized st. dev. of import 1999-2011) 
Export volatility 
(normalized st. dev. of export 1999-2011) 
Imported inputs 
over total import(b) 
0.0066 
(0.0087) 
0.0021 
(0.0090) 
−0.0109 
(0.0082) 
−0.0080 
(0.0057) 
0.0466 
(0.0133)*** 
0.0377 
(0.0136)*** 
0.0186 
(0.0122) 
0.0228 
(0.0093)** 
Inputs over 
production  
0.0111 
(0.0170) 
0.0445 
(0.0160)*** 
−0.0136 
(0.0114)  
0.0285 
(0.0258) 
0.0622 
(0.0239)** 
−0.0136 
(0.0185) 
Import value(b)  5.97e−07 
(2.16e−07)*** 
2.70e−07 
(1.58e−07)*   
1.08e−06 
(3.26e−07)*** 
6.81e−07 
(2.37e−07)***  
Import/GDP(b)    1.3339 (0.0788)***    
1.7147 
(0.1286)*** 
Dummy EU15   −0.0078 (0.0027)*** 
−0.0048 
(0.0025)*   
−0.0079 
(0.0041)* 
−0.0066 
(0.0041) 
Import/GDP*EU15    0.8914 (0.1088)***    
1.4884 
(0.1774)*** 
Country dummy yes yes no no yes yes no no 
Sector dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No. observations 435 432 432 432 435 432 432 432 
R2 0.5576 0.5667 0.4763 0.7472 0.4396 0.4571 0.3583 0.6322 
Note: See Notes to Table 2. 
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Table 4. Volatility of trade flows and IFP during the international financial crisis (2008-2010). 
Explanatory  
variables 
Dependent variable(a) 
Import volatility 
2008-2010 
Export volatility 
2008-2010 
Narrow  
offshoring(b) 
0.0444 
(0.0128)*** 
0.0443 
(0.0127)*** 
0.0805 
(0.0125)***  
0.0175 
(0.0194) 
0.0238 
(0.0184) 
0.0771 
(0.0174)***   
Imported inputs 
over total imports(b)    
−0.0241 
(0.0136)*    
0.0673 
(0.0196)*** 
0.0274 
(0.0184) 
Inputs over 
production  
0.0554 
(0.0253)** 
0.1016 
(0.0248)*** 
0.1375 
(0.0266)***  
0.1078 
(0.0367)*** 
0.1488 
(0.0343)*** 
0.0814 
(0.0370)** 
0.1563 
(0.0361)*** 
Import value(b)  8.39e−07 (3.25e07)** 
4.62e−07 
(2.53e−07)* 
2.81e−07 
(2.64e−07)  
2.16e−06 
(4.73e07)*** 
1.34e−06 
(3.52e−07*** 
1.99e−06 
(4.69e−07)*** 
1.20e−06 
(3.57e−07)*** 
Dummy EU-15   −0.0035 (0.0043) 
−0.0055 
(0.0045)   
−0.0019 
(0.0060)  
−0.0032 
(0.0062) 
Country dummy yes yes no no yes yes no yes no 
Sector dummy yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
No. observations 434 432 432 432 433 431 431 431 431 
R2 0.6997 0.7101 0.6130 0.5771 0.4929 0.5393 0.4386 0.5511 0.4146 
Note: See Notes to Table 2. 
 
demand, as it could be expected. The share of imported inputs is instead positively correlated with export vola-
tility. In this period, the EU15 dummy variable is never significant, even if maintaining the negative sign, hint-
ing to the fact that some convergence in the production structures might have occurred over time between old 
and new members of the EU, or that the shock due to the crisis might have blurred some of the differences be-
tween groups of EU members.  
6. Concluding Remarks  
In conclusion, the evidence of a relationship between volatility of trade flows and the extent of trade in interme-
diate goods for the EU countries does not appear very robust. The relationship seems to depend on countries and 
sectors’ characteristics, but this result cannot be generalized for the entire Europe in the past decade. The link 
between trade volatility and trade in intermediates was stronger when the international financial crisis hit Europe: 
during the crisis, trade flows fluctuations have been stronger (both in terms of falls and rises) in those sectors 
and countries displaying a higher offshoring index. These results are broadly in line with the theory suggesting 
that this relationship is contingent on a number of factors.  
These results are still quite preliminary, as a longer observation period after the crisis is necessary to check 
whether the observed correlation between trade in intermediates and trade volatility during the crisis is a spu-
rious one. In fact, the very strong shock brought with the crisis can be the common cause of many observed 
fluctuations of economic variables in EU countries, without a direct relationship between the variables them-
selves. But if confirmed, these results have interesting positive and normative implications: the increase of in-
ternational production linkages through trade in intermediate inputs does not necessarily imply a higher volatili-
ty of trade flows and a higher exposure to shocks. Therefore, the increased economic integration of the national 
economies through production linkages might speed up the transmission of shocks, but it needs not to increase 
the overall instability of the economic systems.  
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